Other witnesses included: Admiral Frank L. Bowman, Director of the Naval Reactors Program, NNSA, Dr. Everet H. Beckner, Deputy Administrator of the Office of Defense Programs, NNSA, and Mr. Paul M. Longsworth, Deputy Administrator of the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, NNSA

Please find the transcript of the Bennett’s exchange with Brooks below.

BENNETT: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Brooks, I think I heard the answers to my question in your statement, but let's go over them again so that they are very clear. There is a moratorium currently in place, is that correct?

BROOKS: Yes, sir.

BENNETT: And testing is not imminent, is that correct?

BROOKS: That's correct.

BENNETT: You said that there is no anticipation of testing at any foreseeable time in the future. Is that correct?

BROOKS: We do not now foresee.

BENNETT: None that you can now foresee.

BROOKS: That's correct.

BENNETT: And that the testing will not happen unless the president makes a very public finding and the Congress acts in funding that finding. Is that correct?

BROOKS: That's correct.

BENNETT: So the newspaper stories, I think I heard you say, are not correct, that says that nuclear testing is now imminent as a result of the vote we took last year?

BROOKS: I haven't seen the stories that blame me for that one, but in any event.

BENNETT: I'm not blaming you, they blame us.

BROOKS: They are not correct.

BENNETT: So there is no testing pending at the present time?

BROOKS: No, sir.

BENNETT: Or in the future circumstances that you currently can see?

BROOKS: No, sir.

BENNETT: All right.

BROOKS: But I don't want to mislead the committee. If I find a problem that can only be verified through testing, I would not hesitate to recommend to the secretary and he would not hesitate to recommend to the president that we test. I have no reason to believe I'm going to find that problem. But it is a hedge against the possibility of finding that problem that we have asked for the money to ensure that we are ready if that contingency occurs. We have no reason to believe it's going to occur.

BENNETT: All right. Here is a postcard that is currently circulating. I'm sure you have seen it. I get copies of it. I can't respond to most of them because they don't put return addresses on them, they just send them in. And it says, for those that are not familiar with it, "This is an underground nuclear test." And it shows an obvious plume into the atmosphere. Would you comment on that, because it has great currency right now?

BROOKS: Yes, sir. The United States started doing only underground tests following the Limited Test Ban Treaty in the early '60s. In 1970, a test called Baneberry vented; that is to say, although we thought it would all be contained, it was not. Radioactivity was spread off the test site to an area north and west of the site, all within Nevada. There was no radioactivity above background levels detected in Utah, although there had obviously been fallout in Utah -- and indeed, worldwide -- from the atmospheric tests of the '50s and '60s. After Baneberry, we took a six-month moratorium on underground tests. Now in the context of today, when we haven't tested for a year, that doesn't sound like much. But in the '70s, when he had a very robust test program, that was a significant step.

We made a number of both analytic and technical corrections. We decided to make sure -- what had happened was there was a fissure, a crack in the Earth that we had not detected. So first we required that for future tests, we drill more exploratory holes to make sure we would find fissures. We included an evaluation panel that included both testing experts and geologic experts to evaluate the containment design of each test. And then we required that those findings be peer reviewed, in accordance with standard scientific procedures. We set up a series of environmental monitoring stations. And those networks operated continuously.

Now that was a long time ago. But we have not had a repeat of Baneberry. We had some far less significant events -- three, I believe -- in the 20-some odd years following that, two of which resulted in nothing leaving the test site. We are confident that, with the combination of the corrective action we put in place then and the greater scientific understanding that we have now of geology and hydrology and the greater formality that we build into all aspects of nuclear safety and the funding that the Congress has given us in the last two years to make sure we do careful safety analysis, that if we do -- if, at some future date, the president decides that we need to do an underground test, there will be a policy debate, but there won't be any public health issue because we are confident that we will make sure that we do not have a repeat of that 1970 event.

BENNETT: So just to summarize what you have told me, since this occurred in 1970, for the intervening quarter of a century, there has never been a reoccurrence of something like this postcard?

BROOKS: There has certainly nothing been like that. There has been minor venting, nothing like that. Most of it did not leave the test site, on I believe three occasions.

BENNETT: How many tests are we talking about? If we had three occasions, is that out of 30?

BROOKS: Between 1970, in 22 years, I don't know. I would have to give you that for the record. A couple of hundred?

BENNETT: A couple of hundred?

BROOKS: Yes, sir. Let me supply that for the record to make sure I'm giving you the right answer.

BENNETT: Fine. I would appreciate knowing that for the record. So we're within one percent?

BROOKS: I think so, sir. Yes, sir.

BENNETT: And I would like to know the date of the last one.

BROOKS: Yes, sir. I would be more than happy to supply that.

BENNETT: So if it was 15 years ago, there is a little bit higher sense of confidence than if it was five years ago. I would appreciate it.

BROOKS: It was more than 12 years ago since we've done no testing in the last 12 years.

BENNETT: Okay. You say you want to do research, but there is no pressing indication now that that research would lead to testing. Indeed, there is nothing you have in your mind that would suggest that it would lead to testing. But you want to do the research anyway. Are you aware of research that is being done outside of the United States that you feel you want to catch up with? Is that part of the impetus here?

BROOKS: There are multiple impetuses. We don't want to be surprised by developments outside of the United States. That is one reason for looking at advanced concepts and making sure that you understand what the laws of physics will allow. But I think we also want to make sure that we are paying attention to maintaining the safety and reliability of the existing stockpile. So I think there are multiple reasons why we want to look.

I don't rule out that someday the president will want us to have a capability that we don't have. Nuclear Earth Penetrator, in my view, both as a matter of practice and as a matter of law, is a capability we sort of have now; we're just trying to make it better. So that's a somewhat special case. But the principal reason for advanced concepts and the projects that we have looked at are primarily, I think, motivated by making sure we're not overlooking an opportunity to improve safety, security and reliability.

There is a secondary motivation to make sure that we are not subject to technological surprise by someone outside this country. We know that there is a vigorous program in Russia; we don’t understand everything we would like to. I can’t, in an open hearing, go into what we do understand. Some of the things we don’t completely understand, so it would be useful to make sure we understood the technology. I think we are more motivated by safety, security and reliability then by sort of a technological keeping up with others.

BENNETT: All right. But I want to get back to one of the things you said when you outlined the reasons for looking at existing warheads to see if they can be adapted. Clear military utility would move only if the president approves and Congress funds it. And number three caught my attention, because I have not seen it before or maybe I have not been paying attention, when you say this is not a change in our policy, this is deterrence.

BROOKS: Yes sir.

BENNETT: If that is the case that means, for example, this would not have been used in Iraq. Let’s assume that there was a circumstance where this particular weapon, that this adaptation of a weapon that you are researching might strike the joint chiefs as being a good weapon to use in Iraq. Under no circumstances would that be considered a deterrent to anyone else who might attack us. So you are saying it is the position of this administration that the weapon would not be used in that circumstance even if it were available.

BROOKS: We have as a matter of policy in every administration I’m familiar with been very careful not to make dogmatic statements of what a president will or will not do in support of national security. I will not be the one to break that tradition. Let me explain what I did mean.

BENNETT: I’ll accept that; you don’t need to go any further than that. Let me just make the comment that if indeed this president or some future president, as we are going to decide who will be president come November, were come to Congress while I was sitting in Congress and say, "Okay, we have done the research, we think this is a viable weapon, we want to fund it, and we are going to use it in a situation quite like Iraq." This senator would not vote in favor of that. My view of a deterrent and the use of the nuclear stockpile through the Cold War is it is never used unless the other side puts you in a position where you do it. You never use it as an offensive weapon; you never use it in order to project American power. You use it held in reserve as part of the deterrent capacity of the United States of America, which is Polaris submarines and their nuclear weapons. The Polaris submarine has never fired a nuclear weapon in an offensive way and it is there to say to a potential aggressor, "If you proceed with your aggression, this is what awaits you."

BROOKS: That's correct.

BENNETT: And just for the record, that's how I would view if such a weapon, at some point by some future president, were ever proposed in the context of what you have said. I would view that as having to have that same kind of restriction that I currently see on Polaris weapons, Polaris missiles and so on.

I won't put you into that box. I understand that you can't make that firm statement because you are a member of the administration. But I can make that statement because I am answerable to the people of Utah, all of whom have a very great concern, which I most thoroughly share, that we do not want to disarm this country; we do not want to do anything that will harm our national security. But in the end, we want to make sure that, as we move down the road to protect our national security, we do not, in any way, endanger the health and safety of any of our citizens, regardless of the state in which they live. And I am assuming you could support that.

BROOKS: I'm confident I can speak for the president on this one. We agree with that. We have no interest in harming the health and safety of anybody, sir.

BENNETT: We just may give you a little help legislatively at some future point. I haven't made up my mind firmly as to what I may do in terms of legislation that I will offer. But I appreciate your assurance. And we want to do everything we can on this side to make sure that that assurance is not forgotten by whoever replaces you in whatever kind of administration might come along.

BROOKS: Yes, sir.

BENNETT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.